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Abstract. Paper considers Keynes‟ case for fiscal stimulus under depression conditions – a 
case that remains prominent in both policy and academic literature.  It highlights four 
specific real-history instances where, Keynes argued, monetary measures alone would not 
have restored prosperity and, hence, where fiscal activism would have been 
desirable.  These were: 1) the depression of the 1890s; 2) the onset of the Great Depression 
in 1930; 3) the Roosevelt Recovery in 1933; and 4) the 1937-38 contraction in the US.  But 
evidence from all four instances, gathered here, undermines Keynes‟ claims...  Paper then 
shifts to Keynes‟ theoretical rationale, where it turns out that the frequently-cited “liquidity 
trap” argument was only one of several he advanced for monetary policy 
ineffectiveness.  And it was not the one he most-often emphasized, while his own texts 
raise doubt about its coherence.  Keynes view of Depression was intertwined with the 
stagnationist temper of economic theory during the middle 1930s, and with his owncultural 
and aesthetic distaste for “capitalist individualism.” The weakness of Keynes‟ real-history 
illustrations reflects in part his flawed underlying critique of “classical” theory including of 
Say‟s Law- a critique that, because it was so prominent, has often set back 
understanding.  Keynes did not make his case. 
Keywords. International macroeconomics, Money demand, Keynesian macroeconomics, 
Macroeconomic history. 
JEL. B22, B31, E12, E41, E52, N10. 
 
1. Introduction 
uch popular and academic commentary in the years after 2008 stoked 
fear that aggressive monetary policy would work too well, and hence 
would trigger accelerated price inflation. But by 2016, very few central 
banks had met even their modest inflation targets, despite well-publicized use of 
“unconventional” monetary expansion in the US, Britain, Japan, and the Eurozone.  
Inflationary fears were misplaced. 
Meanwhile, many self-identified Keynesians argued, much to the contrary, that 
effectiveness of monetary policy would be sharply constrained under recessionary 
conditions.  Lawrence Summers, who was President Obama‟s chief economist 
during 2009-2010, and who continued afterward to be a frequent advisor, called 
upon the US and other governments to increase borrowing at very low interest rates 
(Summers, 2012). Paul Krugman has made similar arguments in his New York 
Times columns. Both economists argued that governments should look on such 
rates as an opportunity both to boost government demand in the short period and to 
improve their fiscal balance in the long-term. 
Their deeper argument was that monetary measures would do little to stimulate 
the US economy in the wake of the sharp 2008-2009 downturn. Summers wrote 
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repeatedly that there was no point in “quantitative easing,” the prominent open-
market mechanism the Federal Reserve uses to inject reserves, as interest rates 
were already rock-bottom – his premise is that monetary easing works only through 
the mechanism of lowering interest rates (Summers, 2012). Presumably, this is 
what for years he has told Mr. Obama. 
Krugman has argued since 2008 that the US has been in a liquidity trap, which 
Keynes defined as a condition where “almost everyone” prefers holding cash to 
lending (Keynes, 1936, p. 207). Krugman believes Keynes view of the dynamics of 
depression is superior to others, and has in his columns tirelessly expounded the 
case for increased government spending to offset slack spending in the private 
sector.  Keynes (1936, p. 317) also argued: 
It is the return of confidence, to speak in ordinary language, which is so 
insusceptible to control… This is the aspect of the slump which bankers 
and business men have been right in emphasizing, and which economists 
who have put their faith in a „purely monetary‟ remedy have 
underestimated. 
I believe Keynes was, and Summers and Krugman are, mistaken.  Let us 
consider real-history evidence Keynes himself cited against effectiveness of 
monetary policy; it is much weaker than he and his followers have thought.  I will 
then return to his liquidity preference and other arguments offered in the General 
Theory and elsewhere – the coherence of the arguments themselves should be 
considered.  It turns out that the weakness of Keynes‟ examples reflects not merely 
careless use of evidence, but flaws in underlying concept.  
 
2. Keynes’ Real-History Illustrations  
A portion of Keynes‟ reputation as an economist, and of his place in history, 
rests on his diagnoses of crisis situations and his proposed remedies.  Well-known 
examples include his tract on the post-World War One Versailles Conference, The 
Economic Consequences of the Peace (1921), and subsequent writings on 
hyperinflations and then on British deflation during the 1920s.   Another, less well 
known, was his discussion of French monetary and political crises during 1925 and 
1926, which I credited in my own work on the period (Johnson, 1997; Chs. 5 and 
8). His two-volume Treatise on Money (1930) provided detailed and often shrewd 
observations on a wide range of questions, with frequent comment on current and 
past economic events. 
In contrast, the General Theory, the heart of Keynes contribution to economic 
ideas, is light on historical or even contemporary illustration.  So the reader seeks 
to fill the gaps by turning to other writings.  Consider four prominent cases as they 
reflect on Keynes‟ view of roles of monetary and fiscal policy. 
2.1. British Deflation in the 1890s 
An unexpected embrace of fiscal activism comes in the Treatise discussion of 
the deflation of the early 1890s, where Keynes argued that the Bank of England‟s 
gold reserves were abundant and credit was easy.  But prices in Britain and the 
world nevertheless went into decline, which undermined profit and investment and 
reduced employment.  He wrote: 
I consider, therefore, that the history of this period [1890-1896] is a perfect 
example of a prolonged Commodity Deflation – developing and persisting 
in spite of a great increase in the total volume of Bank-Money.  There has 
been no other case where one can trace so clearly the effects of a prolonged 
withdrawal of entrepreneurs from undertaking the production of new fixed 
capital on a scale commensurate with current savings.    
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Keynes then concluded (anticipating his arguments a few years later, including 
in the General Theory,) that monetary expansion does not always work, and that 
there might therefore be a role for public investment projects to boost demand 
(Keynes, 1930, Vol. 2, pp. 169-170). 
Keynes‟ discussion of the 1890s misses the point. Britain in the late nineteenth 
century was part of an open world economy, with easy movement of goods, people, 
and especially capital. Keynes neglected to mention that system-wide demand for 
gold rose much more than the supply from the 1870s through the mid-1890s as 
nearly two dozen countries adopted or re-adopted the gold standard, and hence 
needed to accumulate reserves. Two of the world‟s largest economies, the United 
States and France, also made growing use of gold coins. Indeed, demand drove the 
commodity-exchange value of gold to the highest level it was to reach in four 
centuries of record-keeping (Jastram, 1977) -- the flip-side of deflation of other 
commodity prices. The commodity price decline reduced profits and chilled 
investment demand; but commodity prices were determined in international 
markets, not in Britain.   
While demand for gold was surging, the world‟s monetary gold supply in the 
mid-1890s was at the lowest point it was ever to reach relative to its 1800-1920 
trend line (Johnson, 1997; p. 52
1
). As the mines in the South African Rand cranked 
up production in the 1890s, relative gold supply and commodity prices increased 
nearly in tandem after 1896 – thus ending the Commodity Deflation, and initiating 
a gentle inflation. A growing money stock affected not just the supply of credit (as 
reflected in a declining interest rate), but also the demand for goods and services.  
A result was nearly two decades of economic growth in all of the industrial powers, 
a pattern that was sadly interrupted by the First World War.   
Monetary events were at the heart of both the origins of and recovery from the 
depression of the early 1890s. Keynes himself gave this backhand 
acknowledgement with his comment a few paragraphs later that “the fall of prices 
[in the early 1890s] could only have been avoided by a much greater expansion of 
the volume of bank-money.” It is revealing that Keynes would discuss price 
deflation during that period without mentioning the geographic expansion of the 
gold standard – easily the most important monetary event of the era.   
2.2. The onset of the Great Depression 
Moving to then contemporary events, Keynes‟ discussion of the “slump of 
1930,” an early stage of the Great Depression, also in the Treatise, builds on 
similar themes. While the US stayed on a gold standard throughout, most European 
countries left it early in WWI, then restored it during the 1920s. Economists 
Gustav Cassel, Ralph Hawtrey and Charles Rist had argued a few years earlier that 
the undervaluation of gold following restoration of gold standards at prewar gold 
prices in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy would force world-wide monetary 
contraction. Keynes, in contrast, told the Royal Commission on Indian Currency in 
1926 that central banks would adjust their currency reserve cover ratios if their 
gold stocks became inadequate - which allowed him to dismiss the danger (Keynes, 
1989a; p. 482).
2
 Keynes turned out to be wrong, as he underestimated what we 
might call the mystique of gold money, which would generate resistance to efforts 
to reduce gold ratios or to use foreign exchange as a gold equivalent. 
Keynes listed factors driving interest rates higher during the 1920s: corporate 
borrowing for new industries; governments borrowing to pay reparations and war 
debts; central banks borrowing to add reserves as they restored gold convertibility; 
and speculators borrowing to buy shares of stock. He identified but was less able to 
 
1 League of Nations chart, reproduced in (Johnson, 1997). 
2 (Keynes, 1924) made a similar argument; p. 134-135. 
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explain the collapse internationally in anticipated returns in investment - what he 
would later call the marginal efficiency of capital - that occurred in the mid-1920s. 
As in considering the early 1890s, he did not connect the fall-off in real yields on 
new investment with systemic monetary constraint.   
For these [above listed] events, though they had no bearing whatever on the 
real yield of new investment, were a powerful influence on the market-rate of 
interest (Keynes, 1930, Vol. 2, p. 379). (Italics added.) 
Parallel to what happened in the 1890s, the middle and late 1920s saw a 
commodity deflation as restoration of gold standarts led to a rise in demand for 
gold. Keynes wrote that the only ways to boost demand for goods and services was 
by lowering interest rates, especially long-term rates – or, alternatively, by 
government fiscal activism.  His explanation did not acknowledge the underlying 
monetary problem: that improved returns on investment would require more 
liquidity, either through a higher gold price to restore gold-to-currency reserve 
ratios, or perhaps by abandoning the gold standard altogether. 
2.3. The Roosevelt Recovery in 1933 
Keynes‟ comments in January 1934 on the monetary-fiscal mix in the US were 
baffling.  In one of Roosevelt‟s initial acts as President in March 1933, the dollar 
was allowed to depreciate against gold – thus providing the higher gold price 
mentioned a moment ago. This was a momentous event in monetary history – the 
underlying cause of the interwar deflation had been removed, and the international 
gold standard was never to be restored with the same conviction.  
Keynesnevertheless wrote: 
One half of [Roosevelt‟s] programme has consisted in abandoning the gold 
standard, which was probably wise, and in taking various measures… to 
depreciate the gold value of the dollar… [But i]t is not easy to bring about 
business expansion merely by monetary manipulation.  The other half of his 
programme, however, is infinitely more important and offers in my opinion 
much greater hopes.  I mean the effort to cure unemployment by large-scale 
expenditure on public works and similar purposes. (Keynes, 1989c; p. 308) 
This summary scarcely acknowledges the results of expansionary monetary 
policy undertaken in the US within the previous year. Dollar depreciation 
succeeded at least to the extent any advocate could have hoped. Industrial 
production soared by 57 percent during March-June 1933, the first four months of 
the Roosevelt Administration – this was the one-off increase, not an annualized 
rate -- making up half of what had been lost since 1929. (Federal Reserve data) It 
was, and remains, the fastest rate of expansion in industrial production recorded 
over a four month period in the history of the US. Yet Keynes apparently 
considered this event to be “infinitely” less important than the boost that might 
come from fiscal borrowing for public works programs. 
Had the experiment continued for a few months more, pre-crash production 
levels might have been recovered. Unfortunately, the NIRA (National Industrial 
Recovery Act), announced in July 1933, brought micro-policy changes that had the 
effect of stopping the recovery in its tracks. The NRA (National Recovery 
Administration), set up under NIRA, then negotiated specific sets of codes with 
leaders of the nation's major industries; the most important provisions were anti-
deflationary floors below which no company would lower prices or wages, and 
agreements on maintaining employment and production. Within a short time, the 
NRA reached agreements with most major industries. In a phrase, the NIRA 
wanted to increase prices by restricting output rather than by increasing demand.   
Sumner (2015) provides several rounds of evidence for the contractionary impact 
of NIRA and subsequent New Deal policy.  
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Lest the above appear suspect as a garden-variety right-wing critique of New 
Deal economics, consider that Keynes himself pointed to the “fallacy” of the NRA 
approach. He noted in January 1934 that “rising prices caused by deliberately 
increasing prime costs or by restricting output have a vastly inferior value to rising 
prices which are the natural result of an increase in the nation purchasing power.”  
He added that it was “hard to detect any material aid to recovery in the National 
Industrial Recovery Act” (Keynes, 1989b; p. 299). Within six months after the 
NRA was announced, industrial production had lost half of the gains dropped 
twenty-five percent from the higher level (Sumner, 2012), thus erasing more than 
half of the gains recorded during Roosevelt‟s more successful initial months in 
office.     
Here we are. We saw an historically unmatched recovery for four months 
during 1933, driven almost entirely by a decision to break the straightjacket 
imposed on monetary policy by the international gold standard. Keynes had been 
an able critic of the gold standard in the Tract on Monetary Reform (1924) and 
again in several chapters of the Treatise. The 1933 recovery was then stalled by 
micro-policies of which he was explicitly critical.  Yet Keynes seemed to dismiss 
this entire episode in his call a few months later for fiscal stimulus! 
2.4. The 1937-38 Contraction in the US 
A few years later, Keynes disregarded evidence of the role of monetary policy 
in triggering a sharp relapse into near-depression conditions in the US during 1937-
1938.  The dollar depreciation of 1933 and the formal increase of the gold price to 
$35/ ounce in 1934 meant automatic revaluation of central bank gold stocks and 
gave impetus to increased gold exploration and production – concentrated, as it 
happened, in the Soviet Union. (Keynes noted the irony that increased Soviet 
efficiency in mining of gold was bailing out world capitalism!) He also noted that 
new gold reserves were bringing increased effective demand to the world economy 
that might result in “abnormal profits” (Keynes, 1989d). Keynes sometimes 
acknowledged the role of monetary factors in the economic recovery of the mid-
1930s. 
In a major policy mistake, the US Treasury responded to rising wholesale prices 
in 1936 by deliberately sterilizing new gold inflows.  In this process, dollars issued 
against new gold were drained by sales of other central bank assets. A money 
supply measure, M2, that increased by 12 percent annually during 1934 -1936, 
suddenly turned flat and even slightly negative from about January 1937 to July 
1938 (Irwin, 2012). Real GDP fell by 11 percent during this period, and industrial 
production fell by 30 percent.  Rather than sterilize incoming gold, had the Fed 
intervened in financial markets to target a modest rate of increase in any of a 
number of variables – a money supply indicator, a price index, industrial 
production, either real or nominal GDP growth – much or most of the 1937-1938 
contraction could have been avoided. By April 1938, sterilization was 
discontinued, and economic recovery resumed by that summer.   
In February 1938, Keynes offered advice in a private letter to President 
Roosevelt that mentioned little of this.  He did acknowledge that addressing “credit 
and insolvency problems” was an essential step toward recovery, as doing so 
would create a necessary “supply of credit” – while, one infers, demand for that 
credit would have to come from elsewhere. This comment reflected Keynes‟ more 
frequent 1930s view that expected returns on investment – and demand for goods 
and services generally – were not much affected by monetary factors. He went on 
to recommend that the US could “maintain prosperity at a reasonable level” only 
through “large-scale recourse to… public works and other Investments aided by 
Government funds or guarantees” (Keynes, 1989f). 
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Despite Keynes‟ recommendations, the lesson of all four of the illustrations 
here is that increasing money balances – through central bank open market 
purchases, or through new gold or foreign exchange reserves – does affect 
expected returns on investment in plant and equipment, in equities, and in real 
estate.  
 
3. Arguments for Fiscal Activism 
We could stop here, having assembled evidence of Keynes‟ doubtful 
conclusions about the role of monetary factors in specific pivotal events.  Indeed, 
evidence from these cases points strongly in the opposite direction, toward 
recognizing the crucial role of such factors. Summers‟, Krugman‟s, and other 
Keynesians‟ agrument that monetary policy is ineffective in environments of weak 
demand is undermined. But the prominence of Keynes‟ fiscalist legacy requires 
that we go further.  Evidence aside, what was Keynes‟ argument?  In fact, he had a 
sequence of arguments. 
In 1929, Keynes offered a comparative argument in favor of fiscal stimulus, and 
against monetary stimulus, specific to economic circumstances in Britain at the 
time (Keynes, 1931; p. 124).  Keynes anticipated a portion of an argument Robert 
Mundell was to make decades later regarding the “policy mix,” that is, the 
appropriate mix of monetary and fiscal policy to meet both domestic output and 
external exchange rate targets (Mundell, 1971). Britain in 1929 was on the 
international gold standard, hence was constrained externally by the need to 
maintain gold reserves.  The Bank of England could not simply create credit, 
because, Keynes reasoned, “such credit might find its way to foreign borrowers, 
with the result of a drain of gold out of the Bank.” (More generally, a country loses 
control over monetary policy under fixed exchange rate conditions (Mundell, 
1963).  Hence, Keynes proposed fiscal stimulus to increase domestic demand and 
employment, alongside monetary constraint to maintain Britain‟s reserve and 
exchange rate targets. 
This well-grounded argument also offers possible insight into the economy of 
the early 1890s, where demand among central banks for limited gold reserves 
generated monetary contraction.  Keynes, as we saw, did not make that argument – 
but we can construct it expost. The best solution might have been some 
international agreement to increase demand by modifying the international gold 
standard, perhaps by raising the currency price of gold, or even by a return to 
bimetallism – boosting the stock of monetary reserves by adding silver (Friedman, 
1992). Absent such creative adjustments in monetary policy, a purely national 
approach could have looked to a fiscalist demand boost. But the rush of gold from 
South African mines soon gave life to the prewar gold standard, making structural 
change unnecessary – and, indeed, associating the prewar gold standard with an 
age of lost prosperity in much popular memory. 
3.1. Removing External Constraints 
Keynes soon abandoned this policy-mix argument. Unlike the case in Britain, 
the US in 1929 and 1930 was well-stocked with gold reserves.  An expansionary 
US policy at that time could have eased monetary conditions world-wide, not just 
in the US.  In March 1933, the dollar was floated against gold, hence removing any 
external policy constraint – as appreciation of the value of gold increased the value 
of the US‟ vast reserves. In Keynes‟ embrace of public works spending from 
January 1934 (above), he had shifted ground from his 1929 advice. His newer 
interest was to argue that fiscal activism was preferable to monetary expansion 
even if the latter was not constrained.    
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In Chapter 15 of the General Theory, “Incentives to Liquidity,” Keynes offered 
the argument that monetary policy was specifically unsuited to boost economic 
demand when interest rates approached zero percent.  In conditions where interest 
rates could not be lowered further, Keynes reasoned, a condition of “absolute 
liquidity preference” held. He observed, “In this event, the monetary authority 
would have lost effective control over the rate of interest” (Keynes, 1936; p. 207).  
This “liquidity trap” argument is cited endlessly by latter-day Keynesians in 
support of a fiscalist agenda.   
The argument is misleading. The one example Keynes provides for the possible 
existence of such absolute liquidity preference involved open market operations in 
the US during 1932, which, it has been asserted, did nothing to boost domestic 
demand. But was this because monetary expansion ran into a liquidity trap? In fact, 
the boost to US domestic money was offset by a loss of gold reserves, in part 
through private hoarding. Keynes‟ argument also overlooked the possible effect of 
gold outflow from the US in boosting demand elsewhere. In any event, the real 
story in 1932 was of a gold standard constraint on the supply of money, it was not a 
story of unquenchable demand for liquidity (Sumner, 2015; p. 147).  
Keynes‟ liquidity trap argument establishes much less than he needed.  Keynes 
did not mention zero-bound interest rates as a constraint in any of the four 
situations discussed earlier – yet he called for fiscal stimulus in all of them.  His 
case against monetary activism went well beyond situations of absolute liquidity 
preference; but as we will see in a moment, monetary policy can work even then. 
Much of Keynes‟ vision for government intervention, including fiscal activism, 
follows from his discussion of the fickleness of financial markets (Keynes, 1936; 
Ch. 12). Observing the instability of private sector investment volume, he 
advocated a larger role by the government in stabilizing investment demand, often 
through direct outlays.   
Keynes‟ argument shifted from the instability of the investment function to 
concern that investment was and would remain chronically weak – and hence to the 
conclusion that high unemployment was not self-correcting, but could persist for 
years. As noted earlier, Keynes in the Treatise pointed to a collapse in the marginal 
efficiency of capital as the trigger for both the depression of the 1890s and for the 
“slump of 1930.” In Chapter 17 of the General Theory, on the “Essential Properties 
of Interest and Money,” Keynes (1936; p. 236) noted situations where: 
…[the] rate of interest declines more slowly, as output increases, than the 
marginal efficiencies of capital-assets measured in terms [of the same 
asset].  
as formulated in one of several instances in Chapter 22, “Notes on the Trade 
Cycle”:  
A more typical, and often the predominant, explanation of the crisis is, not 
primarily a rise in the rate of interest, but a sudden collapse in the marginal 
efficiency of capital (Keynes, 1936: p. 315). 
this pattern of falling marginal efficiencies of capital was at the core of Keynes 
increasing skepticism about monetary remedies.
3
 
3.2. New Money and Effective Demand 
Keynes usually argued that monetary policy worked mainly through raising or 
lowering interest rates – this was certainly a premise of the liquidity trap argument.  
Further on in the General Theory, he wrote that “the primary impact of a change in 
the quantity of money on the quantity of effective demand is through its effect on 
 
3 Leijonhufvud (1981) offers a variation on this theme with the comment that in Ch. 37 of the Treatise 
“the assumption that entrepreneurs are right was dispensed with” – that is, entrepreneurs became, in 
Keynes‟ judgment, excessively bearish. Leijonhufvud argues that Keynes‟ subsequent arguments 
relied on fiscal intervention to overcome bearishness. 
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the rate of interest” (Keynes, 1936; p. 298). In the earlier Treatise Chapter 37 on 
“Control of Investment,” where he calls for open market operations a outrance, the 
object is to bring “the market rate of interest… down to the limiting point (Keynes, 
1930; vol 2, p. 371).” Later, in 1937 articles on “finance,” where Keynes (1989E) 
stressed the crucial role of monetary policy in economic recovery, he again 
emphasized the channel of lowering interest rates. 
Keynes‟ interest rate argument is not credible. Monetary economics routinely 
identifies channels other than interest rates through which additional money 
creation can affect demand. For example, Frederic Mishkin, a former member of 
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, has identified channels of exchange rates, 
financial asset prices, real estate prices, wealth effects on consumption, and 
increase in bank lending capacity (among others) through which demand can be 
increased (Mishkin, 1996). Pertinent here, Keynes himself sometimes rejected the 
interest rate argument to make the case that monetary expansion could boost 
demand directly. 
For example, in Chapter 17 of the Treatise, on “Monetary Factors,” Keynes 
noted that monetary stimulus might bring together a previously “unsatisfied fringe 
of would-be entrepreneur borrowers who were ready to borrow… even at the old 
terms [i.e., without lowering interest rates], and … an unemployed fringe of the 
factors of production [i.e., workers] to offer employment to additional quantity of 
the factors of production.” In an additional impact, he wrote that “certain 
entrepreneurs may now be willing to increase their output even if this means 
making higher offers than before to the factors of production because (as the 
ultimate result of the influx of new money) they forsee profits” (Keynes, 1930; vol. 
1, pp. 263-264). As Keynes here illustrates, the underlying goal of monetary 
expansion is to satisfy an unmet demand for money.  The consequence may be to 
lower interest rates, but it may also work by directly increasing demand for goods 
and services, and for credit to purchase them. 
The General Theory has comparable passages.  In Chapter 11, on the “Marginal 
Efficiency of Capital,” Keynes linked changes in investment prospects to prior 
changes in prices.  He wrote, “the expectation of a fall in the value of money [i.e., 
price inflation] stimulates investment, and hence employment generally, because it 
raises the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital, i.e., the investment 
demand schedule” (Keynes, 1936; pp. 141-142). Consider that it is just this link 
between higher prices – as a result of the dollar depreciation -- and the large 
increase in industrial production that Keynes minimized in his earlier-cited 
comments on the US recovery in 1933. In Chapter 21, on the “Theory of Prices,” 
Keynes noted that “new money” could lead directly to increases in effective 
demand, which would be “divided between the rise of prices, the rise of wages, and 
the volume of output and employment” (Keynes, 1936; p. 298). 
“New money,” so understood, can provide the missing link toward 
understanding the real-history illustrations scattered through Keynes‟ writings.  
Lack of “new money” was at the heart of the commodity deflation of the 1890s, the 
slump of 1930, and the near-depression of 1937-1938. Despite Keynes‟ claims 
regarding real-history evidence, the way he understood monetary policy to work 
did not require him generally to reject monetary measures in order to boost 
aggregate demand; and it did not make monetary policy ineffective even with zero-
bound interest rates. But, Keynes wanted the primise that monetary policy was 
powerless as a lead-in to his view of a system in crisis. His views on monetary 
policy and his sometimes anti-capitalist social philosophy came together in his 
forecast for a declining marginal efficiency of capital. 
In Chapter 16 of the General Theory, on “Sundry Observations Concerning the 
Nature of Capital,” Keynes anticipated a future “where capital goods would be so 
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abundant” that the average marginal efficiency of capital – that is, the return on 
investment -- would fall to zero (Keynes, 1936: pp. 213f, 218). It was a logical 
extension of his view of financial markets, driven by fickle expectations, and of 
what in the early 1930s was growing “bear market” sentiment.  He added in his 
final chapter, “Concluding Notes on the Social Philosophy Toward Which a 
General Theory Might Lead,” that such an abundance of capital would bring about 
the  “euthanasia of the rentier, of the functionless investor,” which he described as 
an “aim” of public policy, one perhaps to be realized “within one or two 
generations” (Keynes, 1936; p. 376). In some passages in the General Theory, a 
monetary shipwreck was no longer viewed as a fate to be averted, but rather as a 
step toward social transformation. 
Keynes‟ notion was similar to the Marxian concept of a declining rate of profit -
- following accumulation of physical capital. The stagnationist thesis, Keynesian or 
Marxian, resonated with the Left, especially during the depression-racked Thirties.  
Keynes‟ proposed remedy was to scale back the reach of market relations, and to 
replace them with an expanded role for the State. Leaving the longer term horizon 
and returning to the causes of Depression, Keynes wrote at the end of the General 
Theory: “It is certain that the world will not much longer tolerate the 
unemployment which, apart from brief intervals of excitement, is associated – and 
in my opinion, inevitably associated – with present day capitalistic individualism” 
(Keynes, 1936; p. 381). 
Keynes by then saw the source of economic distress as capitalism run amuck – 
rather than, for example,in a persistent liquidity trap (as an earlier argument in the 
General Theory would have suggested.) Had Keynes proposed a large boost in 
liquidity through open market operations, his inferred premise would have been 
merely that money demand was, for the moment, not being satisfied – not enough 
content for a self-described revolution in economic thinking. Faced with the rising 
appeal of Communism and Fascism in the desperate 1930s, Keynes thought he 
needed more.  In his social and political visions, Keynes often reflected his times; it 
would be hard to conclude that he transcended them. 
There is little evidence since the 1930s for a collapsing rate of profit following 
decades of capital accumulation. Keynes underestimated potential demand for new 
investment, not to mention ongoing obsolescence of previous investment, in a 
world with billions of people, most of them seeking to enhance their material 
comfort and social status. A.C. Pigou, Keynes‟ oft-times nemesis, dismissed the 
stagnationist thesis almost immediately, noting “An era that has witnessed the 
development of electrical apparatus, motor cars, aircraft, gramophone and wireless, 
to say nothing of tanks and other engines of war, is not one in which we can 
reasonably forecast a total disappearance of openings for new investment” 
(Skidelsky, 2005; p. 539). 
Keynes‟ view that the world depression of the 1930s was caused by capitalistic 
individualism has done more damage. The downturns during the decade of 
depression were driven by gold standard rigidity, reserve shortages, inopportune 
central bank sterilization, and to a lesser extent by anti-market micro-economic 
policies associated with the New Deal, the Popular Font and equivalents elsewhere. 
Major economic boosts came from currency depreciations against gold and other 
monetary initiatives. The Depression was not caused by markets disfunction 
irrational pessimism on stock exchanges, excessive capital accumulation, or lack of 
government stimulus.  Whatever the all-in contribution of the General Theory, it 
had the unfortunate consequence of diverting attention from the monetary 
dynamics that had brought depression. Alas, Keynes‟ legacy as received some 
three generations on has contributed to the confusion that fiscal stimulus is the best 
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way to boost demand, while monetary policy is often taken to be either ineffective 
or as just tinkering.  Keynes did not make his case. 
 
4. Keynes and Say’s Law: Does Supply Create its own 
Demand? 
Leaving aside his visionary interludes, Keynes essential claim in the General 
Theory was that unemployment could persist for years, even if wages and other 
factor costs were flexible. The point was that even if factor costs fell, the marginal 
efficiency of capital might not recover because it was driven by market 
expectations -- which were volatile, and trending downward.  Falling costs might 
even be taken, not as restorative, but as evidence of weak demand and sagging 
investment prospects. Investment might then stay below the level needed to 
maintain full employment. Keynes was not asserting that general equilibrium was 
maintained in the face of unemployment, as some critics were later to assert. He 
used the term “equilibrium” more modestly to mean that unemployment could 
persist, and that it was not self-correcting. 
Keynes, at least in his darker moments, saw accumulation of physical capital as 
inexorably leading to lower capital efficiency and declining profits. With this 
premise, an attempt to reboot investment by increasing money and prices – even if 
it succeeded in the short run -- would just mean more rapid accumulation of 
capital, and hence more rapid decline in profits, in a self-reinforcing stagnationist 
circle. This argument could be put to empirical test, and it has been falsified by 
subsequent decades of growth. To be fair, it pushes Keynes‟ suppositions to the 
edge of what his text might support, and Keynes never wrote it down, not in so 
many words. 
Keynes narrower conclusion, that unemployment could persist despite flexible 
input costs, draws on his well-known discussion of Say‟s Law near the beginning 
of the General Theory. Keynes quotes John Stuart Mill‟s description of the 
“classical” doctrine according to which “supply creates its own demand” as a 
counterpoint to his own grand design. Keynes quoted Mill to demonstrate that 
“classical” economists thought it possible to “double the purchasing power” merely 
by “doub[ling] the supply of commodities in every market” (Keynes, 1936: p. 18).  
Perplexingly, Keynesthen chopped off the rest of Mill‟s paragraph, in which was 
included – 
…money is a commodity; and if all commodities are supposed to be doubled 
in quantity, we must suppose money to be doubled too, and then prices would 
no more fall than values would. (Mill, 1909; p. 558) 
Algebraically, an excess supply in one market must be matched by an excess 
demand in another. A shortfall of demand for goods implies a matching excess 
(unsatisfied) demand for money.  A supply of goods creates its own demand for 
goods only if demand for money is satisfied. Mill and other Classics recognized 
this – and far from finding a flaw in Mill‟s argument, Keynes mis-stated it. 
Regarding Keynes‟ omission, Mundell wrote:  
…Keynes perpetrated an historical error in the economics profession lasting 
several years, a distortion of the classical position that to this day remains in 
the elementary textbooks.  By thus attacking the logic of the central feature of 
the classical theory through carelessness or mischievous omission of its 
essential parts, Keynes was able to win disciples over to the belief that there 
was a fatal logical defect, an absurd premise, in the classical system 
(Mundell, 1968; p. 110). 
As suggested earliner, Keynes wanted his critique of monetary policy. His 
historical evidence, alas, does not support either argument. 
Journal of Economics Library 
JEL, 3(2), C. Johnson, p.214-225. 
224 
As we acknowledge Mill‟s premise that increased money can satisfy the 
demand for liquidity, and thereby directly boost demand for goods and services, 
Keynes arguments focused narrowly on the effect of increased money on interest 
rates are undermined furher. Keynes overall disregard of the supply of gold in the 
1890s and 1920s, and his de-emphasis of the price of gold then and again in 1933, 
followed closely upon his neglect (in his critique of Say‟s Law) of the link between 
monetary adequacy and demand for goods and services. 
With somewhat more effect, Keynes did provide a critique of the conventional 
Quantity Theory of money – which he had himself endorsed in his earlier Tract. In 
the Treatise, he argued the case over several chapters that some cost and other 
factor price increases were tied directly to increases in the quantity of money, while 
price increases that feed into profits might be less correlated with changes in the 
money supply. Indeed, where demand for money balances increases, a higher 
quantity of money might even coincide with lower aggregate profits and hence 
with lower prices (Keynes, 1936; pp. 208-209). Slaying the Quantity Theory, was 
important to many of Keynes‟ early followers, in whose understanding it opened 
the way to an active role for the State and to deploying an array of fiscal 
“multipliers.” 
It is otherwise less important.  Monetary economics has by now moved past the 
Quantity Theory, or growth of the money supply, as a policy marker. Many, if not 
most central banks now seek to stabilize expectations by targeting a steady rate of 
price inflation. Lars Svensson (2008) has recorded that Milton Friedman, the most 
prominent monetary economist of his era, told him late in his life that he 
(Friedman) agreed monetarists should target changes in prices rather than growth 
in the money supply. Scoot Sumner and other (2012) and orher “market 
monetarists” urge central banks instead to target a rate of growth in Nominal GDP.4 
I would qualify their recommendation with the suggestion, given the dollar‟s role 
as the world economy‟s key liquid asset, that US monetary authorities should also 
target foreign exchange rates during financial crises, especially the dollar-euro rate. 
But nothing about moving beyond the Quantity Theory makes monetary policy less 
important, or makes interest rates the only channel, or even the dominant channel, 
through which it can be effective. 
The irony is that Keynes, the acclaimed revolutionary of Depression economics, 
had so little to say about the uses of monetary policy when interest rates fell to 
historic lows and anticipated investment returns went even lower. Correctly 
understood, the real-history evidence in the opening section suggests that economic 
slumps and unemployment persisted because effective monetary expansion did not 
occur. This was true where the marginal efficiency of capital was falling sharply, 
and even where interest rates were already very low. The de-stabilizing factor was 













4 Sumner‟s blog www.themoneyillusion.com 
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